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FOREWORD
The legal treatment of corporations has been a source of prolific academic
commentary and criticism. Much of it-the commentary concerned generally
with the relationship between business enterprise and society-is beyond the
scope of this symposium. Rather the symposium focuses more narrowly on
the peculiarities of the corporate form and the laws regulating corporate behavior.
In the past fifty years, writing about corporation law has pursued several
distinct lines of inquiry. One such line of analysis began with Berle and
Means' demonstration that ultimate legal ownership was separate from effective control in large publicly held corporations.' Finally persuaded that corporate owners were content to leave managing to professional managers, this
school of criticism advocated increased disclosure about corporations to public
investors as a means of enhancing the capacity of market mechanisms to
check management behavior. Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 also responded to the separation of ownership from control by attempting to create working shareholder democracies-or, at the least, voting
republics-through a system of federal proxy regulation. Its underlying
theory postulated that shareholders would be better able to call a corporation's managers to account if they were given certain pieces of information
about the corporation's business and the consequences of decisions which state
corporation law requires shareholders to make. This school of writing about
the corporation has acquired its own complementary school of critics and
skeptics who analyze the purported benefits of disclosure, quantify its costs,
and examine the relevance of the information disclosed to the decisions made
by shareholders and investors, or prospective shareholders.
Wholly apart from efforts to increase the accountability of corporate managers through the flow of corporate information to the market and shareholders, much attention has been given to the proper relationship between
federal and state regulation of internal corporate decisions. Some critics of
corporate theory have been troubled by the conflict in both tone and sub-

stance between the constraints imposed on internal corporate functions by
state corporation laws and those imposed by the federal securities laws. Out1. A. BERLE &
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right federal incorporation or minimum federal requirements for state regulation of corporate behavior have been suggested as a solution to this untidy
conflict as well as to the substantive deficiencies of promanagement state incorporation laws, perceived by many as insufficiently protective of various
shareholder concerns. These proposals pose significant questions about their
implications for concerns tangential to federalism-for example, jurisdictional
and other litigation-allocating devices-as well as traditional corporate-law
matters. Indeed, some argue that these proposals are solutions in search of
problems, that state corporation laws afford adequate protection to legitimate
shareholder interests, and that there have been intimations on the state-court
level of a renaissance in the enforcement of managers' fiduciary duties toward
the corporation and its minority shareholders.
A separate school of academic criticism has examined the impact of corporate decisions on interests outside the corporation. Its initial concern was
whether corporations have a duty to behave in socially responsible ways even
if that behavior could not be justified as increasing the corporation's profitability. More recently the focus of this criticism has shifted to an examination
of corporations' internal structure and decisionmaking processes and to an
argument that the present internal structure of corporations increases the
likelihood of harmful corporate behavior. Related in interest, perhaps, if not
in ideology, are those critics who examine and criticize corporations' internal
structure with an eye to its effectiveness in controlling management behavior.
Many of the energies of corporation-law reformers at midcentury were
taken up with efforts to reshape the law to permit greater flexibility in corporate structure and operation, especially for closely held corporations. The
near-complete victory of these reformers effectively demystified the corporation, took away rigid legal definitions of its characteristics, and left it as the
mere result of private contract. Thus, in the view of one critic, when American law ceased to take the corporation seriously, it eliminated the legitimacy
of scholarly interest in the corporation, and "corporation law, as a field of
intellectual effort, [was] dead in the United States."'2 Dead once, perhaps, but
never interred, corporate-law scholarship has been reborn in its present protean form as an inquiry into changes in corporate structure and regulatory
reform aimed at effective constraints on management misbehavior and more
efficient securities markets. This symposium, Law and Contemporary Problems'
third venture into corporation law, 3 is an indication of the diversity and vitality of contemporary scholarship about the corporation.
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